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Deputized Brokers: A Technique for a Case
Study of Conservative Think Tanks in 1990s
Welfare Reform
SERGIO ROMERO
Boise State University
This study proposes a novel analytical technique in a case study
of think tank brokerage. As brokers, think tanks structurally
link foundations and media, yet they do so as representatives of
a policy network consisting of corporate funders and affiliated
think tanks. Print media sought their policy analysis regarding
the welfare system and prescriptions for reform. Network and content methods are the bases for the presentation of the technique.
The coupling of results from each of the technique’s components
shows how resources tie actors, as well as how their conversion
from one form to another is the basis for a newfound understanding of structural brokerage. Taken together, the findings demonstrate the significance of representative brokerage that deepens the
meaning of the policy advocacy mission of these organizations.
Key words: brokerage; social network analysis; content analysis;
conservative think tanks; welfare reform

In recent decades, social scientists have examined the role
of policy-planning organizations in the policy process. Interest
ranges from think tanks’ relationship to the state (Abelson,
1996; McGann & Weaver, 2000; Ricci, 1993), influence with
the media (Abelson, 1992), interlocks with the corporate community (Burris, 1992; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, &
Beaulieu, 2002), consensus-building roles (Burris, 2008; Carroll
& Carson, 2003), policy-motivated funding support (Callahan,
1999; Colwell, 1993; Covington, 1997; Lagemann, 1999;
Messer-Davidow, 1993; Roelofs, 2003; Saloma, 1984), and the
agenda-setting activities of think tanks in policy development
(see Burch, 1997; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; Jenkins
& Shumate, 1985; McDonald, 2008; Messer-Davidow, 1993;
Peschek, 1987; Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004; Svihula & Estes, 2008;
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at the state level is the appearance of think tanks as neutral,
nonaligned policy organizations. Their tax-exempt status
underscores this structural façade. However, as research has
demonstrated, these organizations are anything but impartial
to the “stability and reproduction of a system shaped by capitalist social relations” (Peschek, 1987, p. 216; see also Burris,
2008; Carroll & Carson, 2003). They are entrusted as deputies
of a network’s corporate interests (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6) that
carry forward the general policy preferences of their corporate
benefactors through several pipelines, including media. Prior
research has examined their reliance upon (Abelson, 1992) as
well as impact on the media (Dolny, 1996, 1997, 1998; Rich,
2001). For example, news bureaus on the East Coast and in the
Midwest seek last-minute comment from think tanks located
on the West Coast before print deadlines (Katz, 2009, pp.
12-13). This study examines the structural, intermediary location between funding sources and transmitters of policy analysis (see Figure 1), which is operationalized here as brokerage.
The ties that connect think tanks and media are derived
from dual interests by both. Print media, for example, turn to
authoritative sources to clarify complex, technical matters for
their storylines and sometimes provide a forum in the op-ed
section for individual analysts to champion policy matters.
The think tanks sampled in this paper leverage this need for
expertise by advocating their policy analysis. For example, the
Heritage Foundation allocated 13% of its budget in the 1990s
to marketing, including nearly half a million dollars for consultants to assist them in these efforts (Georges, 1995). The
president of Heritage stated they “stress an efficient, effective
delivery system. Production is one side; marketing is equally
important” (emphasis added) (Covington, 1997, p. 14). The
president of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) similarly
declared:
I make no bones about marketing… We pay as much
attention to the dissemination of the product as we do
the content. We’re probably the first major think tank to
get into the electronic media. We hire ghost writers for
scholars to produce op-ed articles that are sent to the
one hundred and one cooperating newspapers—three
pieces every two weeks. (p. 20)
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The newsprint media citations referenced in this case study
are a consequence of concerted efforts by these organizations
to market themselves as credible sources of policy expertise
(Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004).
The present study seeks to broaden the research on think
tanks by introducing a novel analytical technique that, if
parsed, would appear as two distinct cases. Consisting of
both network and content analyses, the technique’s quantitative and qualitative structure is applied to a case study of
conservative think tanks that participated in the development
of welfare reform in the 1990s. Alone, each of these methods
shed light on the network characteristics and semantic content
of the think tanks’ relationships with foundations and media.
These relationships are determined by the resource substance
that establishes their ties: funding (i.e., capital) that connects
foundations and think tanks; and policy analysis (i.e., information) linking think tanks to media. Knowledge of the above
linkages is not new. The objective of this study’s analytical
technique is to operationalize brokerage that recognizes mixed
resource types in the process of connecting structurally distinct
groups of actors. The empirical research on brokerage is generally focused on the study of persons and a singular resource—
usually information. To proceed with the investigation, I pose
two levels of questions, the first concerning each method:
At the network level, how is structural equivalence
ascertained, and what does this indicate about a think
tank’s similarity and dissimilarity with its peers?
At the semantic level, what are the policy criticisms and
reform prescriptions, and what does their frequency of
appearance suggest?
This study’s mixed methods approach presents an opportunity to peer into brokerage, beyond observing how brokers
link otherwise unconnected actors (for which they are known).
The second set of hypotheses concerns the implications of
combining these methods:
How similarly does network equivalence correspond
with media impact?
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How is the resource structure of capital and information
an indicator of brokerage?
The point of the study is to present a systematic analysis of think tanks that incorporates a broader understanding
of structural brokerage in social network analysis (e.g., Burt,
2005; Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Marsden, 1982; Rydgren, 2005)
at the organizational level (Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Knoke,
2009).
The social network analysis measures employed for the
politically conservative policy network are drawn from financial ties between think tanks and private foundations that fund
them. The procedures systematize the descriptive analysis of
relational ties found in much of the literature regarding these
organizations (see Roelofs, 2003; Saloma, 1984; Stefancic &
Delgado, 1996). The dispensation of general operating grants
for policy analysis by foundations sampled in this paper is not
a common practice in the mainstream of private foundations
(Colwell, 1993; Covington, 1997; Krehely, House, & Kernan,
2004; Saloma, 1984; Stefancic & Delgado, 1996). This operational strategy portends a practice critical to the outcomes of
think tank activities. As noted by other scholars, this type of
resource commitment permits think tanks to shift organizational resources on an as-needed basis toward policy issues
that may suddenly warrant their attention (Krehely et al.,
2004; Rich, 2004). The absence of project-specific grants that
constrain an organization’s activities expands the autonomy
of think tanks to engage in creative advocacy of the network’s
policy preferences.
Foundations are generally regarded as passive institutions
barred from directly engaging with the political process (e.g.,
campaign donations, lobbying, etc.). Yet, their bystander role
does not mean they don’t exert influence regarding think tank
activities. For instance, according to Covington (1997), “in
1986, Olin and Smith Richardson foundations withdrew their
support from [AEI] because of substantive disagreement with
certain of its policies” leading to the resignation of its president (p. 15). Krehely et al. (2004) noted that conservative foundations have a high degree of interaction with grant recipients
“meeting with them at least once formally during the year,
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and several additional times informally at various conferences, retreats and meetings” (pp. 55-56). The structure of grant
money identified in this study involves an exchange relationship where one actor provides a valuable and needed resource
(money) to another in return for the latter’s tacit conformity
(Knoke, 1993). The competitive nature of fundraising-dependent non-profit organizations reinforces the general interests
of the funding party, in this case a category of philanthropies
that prioritize support for policy analysis in their funding missions (Covington, 1997; Saloma, 1984). By combining content
analysis of media ties with network measures, the politically
conservative think tanks assume a structural role as the deputy
of the foundations’ general policy preferences.

Brokerage
Brokerage refers to strategic actors that control or coordinate the flow of network resources between clusters of actors
(Marsden, 1982). Brokers facilitate the exchange of resources
derived from bridging structural holes across networks (Burt,
2005). The holes or gaps enable them to function as a resource
bridge between actors and the networks they represent. Brokers
may accrue benefits (e.g., status, promotion, experience, commissions, etc.) as a consequence of influencing resource flows.
Brokerage demonstrates a distinct capability of linking
otherwise disconnected actors (Gould & Fernandez, 1989;
Marsden, 1982). Thus, brokers are visionaries of resource transactions that might otherwise be unfulfilled. In a sense, they
take advantage of opportunities either ignored or addressed
on a limited basis. They manifest social capital by “detecting
and developing rewarding opportunities” generated from ties
—strong and weak, close and distant—to actors, social networks, or other social structures (Burt, 2005, p. 18; Everett &
Borgatti, 2005). Social capital theory casts light on characteristics of broker advantage, especially for self-interested purposes. A recent study of organizational social capital found that
possession of it by corporate alliances was key to facilitating
(as well as limiting) opportunities in a multi-industry system
(Knoke, 2009).
Generally, brokerage is measured with betweenness
centrality, a derivative measure in social network analysis.
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Betweenness refers to an ego’s intermediary location between
alters in a network. The alters depend on the ego’s betweenness to connect them to distant alters (Scott, 2000). Betweenness
centrality “recognizes that intermediate actors can control
the messages passing through indirect channels” assumed to
take place within a relatively restricted network of exchanges
(Marsden, 1982, p. 205). This position confers a certain degree
of power. Sociograms in network visualization software (such
as Netdraw) illustrate an actor’s betweenness network location which network scores alone are incapable of displaying
(Scott, 2000).
In Figure 1, conservative think tanks are positioned
between structurally distant actors. This enables the ego
grouping (i.e., conservative think tanks) to directly transmit
resource-influenced policy interests to alters of significance
(e.g., media) that could otherwise be channeled through indirect, circuitous routes by remote actors. For example, practices
think tanks frequently engage in for their constituents such as
emails, workshops, conferences, or publications would yield
limited policy diffusion. Though these practices may percolate
to a mass audience, they may not be as effective in reaching it
as broadly or efficiently as through the media, especially with
hot-button legislation. The streamlining of that process has potential benefits. Knoke (1990) suggested that “as the number
of ties between actors decreases, power accruing to any one
broker rises” (p. 144).
A recent essay by Everett and Borgatti (2005) proposes an
extension of the betweenness centrality concept to the supraindividual level by considering a set of actors’ attributes for
analysis. They contend that attributes such as ethnicity, age,
or occupation may be used as a source for group-level centrality measurement. The operationalizing of this concept in
this manner encourages problematizing brokerage beyond
persons. Their approach extends our understanding of brokerage, but nevertheless is limited to mediating roles within a
network, where a singular resource is assumed to be transmitted. This is consistent with the literature. The current paper’s
technique sketches a structural brokerage role that integrates
two seemingly distinct networks differentiated by the resource
types. The conservative policy network is the core of the
think tanks’ identity, but the media associated network is the
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recipient of the base network’s interests. Hence information,
not money, is the transmitted resource. Though not examined
with traditional network measures, the latter network completes the picture of the think tanks’ structural role.
Furthermore, the empirical research takes for granted
the resource type, typically information, as the medium of
exchange in brokers’ activities. The control of sought-after
knowledge may translate into advantages for the intermediate holder of it. This applies to capital. Brokers, conscious or
not, manipulate this exchange by virtue of their structural location (Marsden, 1982). Thus, their role is dependent upon the
patterns of relations between actors with whom they connect
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Extant research also recognizes a
broker’s resource utility to determine the activity role of the
think tank (see ideal types in Gould & Fernandez, 1989). The
present study considers brokers that traverse their core membership network to connect with organizational actors vis-à-vis
the resources they exchange, which forms another network. I
posit the two methods side-by-side.
The theoretical model of brokerage for this paper’s analysis
is based on Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) concepts of information transaction brokers. Brokers may perform any one or combination of brokerage functions, but according to the authors,
each transaction is exclusive to an ideal type, including:
Coordinator: broker and actors are connected to similar
group;
Cosmopolitan: actors being connected belong to the
same group, but broker is outsider;
Representative: initiator of resource and broker belong
to same group, but resource passes through broker as it
leaves the group;
Gatekeeper: broker is the recipient of external resources
and in the position to redistribute these (or not) to comembers; and
Liaison: broker and connecting actors each belong to
disparate groups.
For simplicity’s sake, conservative think tanks in this paper
are viewed as performing a representative broker function.
They carry forward the general policy preferences of their corporate benefactors in their policy-related activities (Domhoff,
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2010). The financial relationship between these actors is described in much of the literature as an ideological policy
network (e.g., Burris, 2008; Saloma, 1984). Trends in funding
patterns, descriptions of policy philosophies, and identification of similar policy goals underscore such networks (e.g.,
Arnove, 1980; Krehely et al., 2004; Saloma, 1984). Vasi (2011),
however, argues that if two sub-groups comprising a network
are ideologically compatible, the representative and gatekeeper brokers dissolve (i.e., miscible) into each other as one ideal
type, or representative brokerage. While the policy goals of
the private foundations and think tanks in this paper’s sample
are compatible (e.g., support of free-market principles; conflict
with the reach of the welfare state; etc.), think tank brokerage
is not miscible. These organizations have distinct functions
which are reinforced by tax law. Moreover, think tanks are not
recipients of external funds that they redistribute to foundations or think tanks in the policy network, as the gatekeeper
role would suggest.
As mentioned previously, conservative think tanks are explicit about the bridge they engineer to disseminate their policy
preferences. Burt (2005), however, contends brokers do not
optimize their access to structural holes. In other words, they
do not necessarily set out to be brokers. “People vary in their
ability to detect holes in social structure … and inaccurately diagnose the value of their network” (p. 28). The target audience
for think tank policy analysis is lawmakers, but perhaps their
policy advocacy facilitated a rethinking of the relationship
bridge to media as a by-product of this goal (Burt, 2005). As
Burt and others (Marsden, 1982) have shown, brokers emerge
organically, based in part on actors' needs in a network.

Data and Methods
The primary unit of analysis for this study is the think
tanks from which the resource-based ties to foundations
and print media are constructed. First, a purposive sample
of eleven conservative foundations were identified reputationally from “actors widely believed by knowledgeable observers to have the actual or potential power to ‘move and
shake’ the system” (Knoke, 1993, p. 30; also see Campbell,
2000). Reputational sampling is problematic, but it sufficed to
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demonstrate the technique. Studies of philanthropic foundations that program monies for policy analysis identify them in
a variety of ways, including samples derived: with a minimum
asset level ($10 million) and a minimum annual percentage of
grants (5%) awarded toward public policy analysis (Colwell,
1993, pp. 10-11); annual grant-making totaling over a million
dollars (Covington, 1997; Howell, 1995; Saloma, 1984); or
through snowball sampling (Allen, 1992; Stefancic & Delgado,
1996). Their identified reputation in the literature then led to
an examination of mission statements outlining their general
policy principles located on their websites or in annual reports.
The mission statements reflect their political philosophies regarding the function of the welfare state and economy. The
group of conservative foundations identified include: Bradley
Foundation (BF); Carthage Foundation (CF); Castle Rock
Foundation (CRF); Adolph Coors Foundation (ACF); Earhart
Foundation (EF); JM Foundation (JMF); Philip M. McKenna
Foundation (PMF); John M. Olin Foundation (JOF); Smith
Richardson Foundation, Inc. (SRF); Scaife Family Foundation
(SFF); and Sarah Scaife Foundation (SSF).
Second, conservative think tanks identified in this article
for years 1992 to 1994 were also subjected to the reputational
criteria. The literature on these organizations identifies as few
as a handful to as many as one hundred and eight conservative think tanks (Allen, 1992; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997;
Howell, 1995; Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004; Saloma, 1984; Smith,
1991; Stefancic & Delgado, 1996; Stoesz, 1987). For example,
Covington (1997) identified the top eighteen grant-receiving think tanks between 1992 and 1994. Five of the six think
tanks that I sample appear consistently in the top tier of those
most frequently cited by media (Dolny, 1996, 1997, 1998). We
can reasonably expect these organizations to express similar
policy preferences with major pieces of legislation, especially
in regards to reforms in the social welfare state that call for
a ‘limited government, personal responsibility, and free enterprise.’ The differences in policy prescription reflect reform disagreements but are not cleavers of a fundamental philosophy
as it regards the welfare state or economy. Further examination
of welfare-related policy areas on their websites, such as federal
government deregulation of health and human services, were
indicators of their policy preference vis-à-vis welfare reform.
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The content analysis is the qualitative aspect of the paper’s
technique. The sample of think tanks for this paper’s technique is not meant to be exhaustive. The focus is not exclusive
to the top reputable organizations nor to frequency of media
citations regarding welfare reform or the welfare state. Rather,
the focus is on how to demonstrate one half of the technique.
Three of the six think tanks have national and international
policy scopes, and the other half tend to restrict themselves to
domestic and/or regional issues.
The sample of think tanks consisting of the paper’s conservative policy network include: American Enterprise Institute
(AEI); Cato Institute; Heritage Foundation; Hudson Institute;
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; and National Center
for Policy Analysis (NCPA). The first three are located in
Washington D.C. The Manhattan Institute is located in New
York City, the Hudson Institute in Wisconsin, and NCPA in
Texas. Although it would be ideal to have data from a larger
sample of think tanks and more newspaper articles over more
years, the presentation of this paper’s technique is a useful first
step.
Network Analysis
The ties connecting think tanks with conservative foundations are motivated by philosophies and established through
money. I apply network analysis on two grounds: (1) to discern
relationships of mutual interest where one set of actors (i.e.,
foundations) provides resources to another group of actors
(i.e., think tanks) to buttress the latter’s activities (Domhoff,
2010; Knoke, 1993; Krehely et al., 2004); and (2) to explore the
extent to which policy network equivalence is similar to their
frequency of media citations. The former investigates characteristics in the network and the latter examines whether the
patterning of network similarities is comparable to their appearance in print media. Media coverage is a means for foundations to monitor the success of grant-receiving think tanks
(Krehely et al., 2004). The network relationships are examined vis-à-vis structural equivalence and relational network
measures.
The UCINET 6 software program (Borgatti, Everett, &
Freeman, 2002) was used to render scores and mapping from
sociomatrices representing the think tanks’ financial ties to
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foundations. Three measures in network analysis calculate
structural similarity in membership and relational characteristics: affiliation, density, and cluster analyses. Affiliation analysis measures how think tanks are connected with each other as
a result of receiving grants from a set of foundations. Density
measures the proportion of actual ties to the maximum possible
relations (Scott, 2000). To what extent do think tank ties with
foundations represent network cohesion? Cluster analysis is a
procedure for identifying subsets of actors based on their structural similarities. Think tanks may be similar (or dissimilar) to
one another in terms of their network ties (direct and indirect)
determined by their grant-receiving patterns. Thus, clusters
are contingent on the density levels found (Scott, 2000).
This paper assumes that grant-receipt ties are expressions
of trust (Krehely et al., 2004; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook,
2001). It considers Knoke and Laumann’s (1982) concept of a
policy domain whose organizational members are recognized
by “specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation … concerned with formulating,
advocating, and selecting courses of action” to analyze problems associated with the policy (p. 256). The policy domain’s
time frame for this study is 1992 through 1994. The time frame
represents a brief period in the run-up to welfare reform enacted
in 1996. As Withorn (1998) and others point out, welfare reform
was a path-breaking policy that galvanized various segments
of conservatism (O’Connor, 2001; Piven, 2004; Williams, 1997),
including the sample of think tanks and foundations in this
paper.
Content Analysis
The second step of the paper’s technique is an analysis of
the network’s policy preferences represented by what think
tanks articulate and what is attributed to them. What do they
convey, in what frequency, and what are the implications of
both? Articles from U.S.-based dailies containing references
or op-ed articles by conservative think tank representatives
were searched. Keywords—welfare, welfare reform, dependency, and poverty—were searched alongside the names of
each organization. For example, claims decrying the wastefulness of the federal government’s social spending were located
along with similar assertions about the government spending
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trillions on programs since the War on Poverty was declared
in 1965. Much of the coding depended on a latent semantic
analysis of themes that relied on a reading of works by authors
self-identified as conservatives, such as George Gilder (1981),
Charles Murray (1984), Lawrence Mead (1986) and Marvin
Olasky (1995) on the social welfare state and welfare reform.
I coded for two conceptually broad themes that took one of
two shapes: criticism of the welfare system (including the role
of the state and its policies) and policy reform prescriptions.
These dichotomous categories are a partition of what appeared
after sub-categories were constructed. Ten percent of the newspaper articles (i.e., 23 of 230) were sampled. This procedure
drew eight sub-categories, later clarified with a thorough examination of all the newspaper articles. A total of 594 content
units were gleaned from the universe of articles obtained electronically through searches in Academic Universe (Lexis/
Nexis) and ProQuest Newstand from 53 of the most important
newspapers available in the United States.
Table 1. Think Tank Affiliations, Aggregate (3 years)
HF

AEI

CATO

MI

HI

NCPA

HF

9

8

4

7

6

7

AEI

8

10

5

8

7

7

CATO

4

5

5

5

5

4

MI

7

8

5

9

8

7

HI

6

7

5

8

8

6

NCPA

7

7

4

7

6

8

Key: HF=Heritage Foundation; AEI=American Enterprise Institute; CATO=Cato
Institute; MI=Manhattan Institute; HI=Hudson Institute; NCPA=National Center for
Policy Analysis

Findings
Network Analysis Results
The first research question directs our attention to structural similarities. The affiliation ties representing think tank
membership with foundations was aggregated for years
1992 to 1994 (see Table 1). The row-by-column cells for each
think tank to itself represent the cumulative number of
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foundations from which it received grant awards over this
period. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) obtained foundation monies from ten of the eleven possible foundations.
Manhattan and Heritage received the second most grants from
nine foundations. The adjacent row-by-column cells indicate
the overlap that a think tank has with its network colleagues.
Again, by way of example, Heritage and AEI shared eight
foundations from which they received grants.
Density analysis paints a picture of the degree to which
foundations and think tanks intermingle, suggesting network
cohesion. For this reason, matrices in each year were coded in
binary form representing either the presence or absence of a
tie. A perfect score of 1 means all possible links are filled, while
0 indicates no linkage. Density for 1992 was .590. In 1993 it
was .545, and in 1994 it yielded .393. The aggregated density
of the overall network (11 foundations by 6 think tanks) is .510
for the three years of grant analysis. This score indicates that
at least fifty-one percent of all possible grant donations from
every foundation were distributed to every think tank, thus
constituting a network.
Table 2. Hierarchical Think Tank Clusters, Aggregate (3 years)
CATO

HF

AEI

MI

HI

45.00

X

X

41.00

X

X

X

NCPA

34.07

X

X

X

X

26.23

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

19.13

X

Key: HF=Heritage Foundation; AEI=American Enterprise Institute; CATO=Cato
Institute; MI=Manhattan Institute; HI=Hudson Institute; NCPA=National Center for
Policy Analysis

I now turn to cluster analysis to represent sub-groups
or clusters based on similar characteristics of grant-receipt.
Following Johnson’s (1967) hierarchal clustering, I ranked the
most similar think tanks near the top, followed by groupings
of increasingly heterogeneous actors at each level below. The
scores represent discrete thresholds that indicate the average
level of actor similarities for that cluster (see Table 2). At each
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regarding welfare reform issues were identified from a universe of 230 newspapers articles between 1992 and 1994. Two
broad thematic categories were underscored by the eight
primary themes that emerged upon closer semantic inspection of the articles (see Table 3). The first category contends
the welfare system is a pernicious social policy that: (a) is
costly, inefficient, and harmful because it is administered by
the federal government; (b) has far-reaching consequences,
including adverse effects on the welfare participants’ participation in the labor force, child-bearing and -rearing, and marriage stability; (c) doesn’t alleviate poverty nor dissuade the
poor from relying on general assistance; (d) misrepresents real
poverty and minimizes abundant prosperity; and (e) relies on
liberals' misguided assumptions about the state and the poor.
Table 3. The Conservative Policy Network’s Claims of Welfare
Reform, 1992-1994
Theme Description

N

%

Thematic Category One: Pernicious Welfare System
1

Criticism of Welfare Programs/State

117

20

2

Pernicious Social Effects of Welfare

190

32

3

Criticism of Liberal Support for Welfare

29

5

4

Poor are Better Off

47

8

383

65

Total:
Thematic Category Two: Welfare Reform Prescription
5

Welfare Reform Goals

87

14

6

Welfare Reform Objectives

93

16

7

Welfare Reform Predictions

20

3

8

Private Sector Alternative

11

2

Total

211

35

Totals

594

100

The results indicate that the social effects of the welfare
system have the highest thematic content units, followed by
criticism of the welfare system and welfare reform objectives
and goals. Parsing all of the content units year by year saw
a steady increase between 1992 and 1993 from one hundred
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twenty-four to one hundred forty-nine recorded references.
There was a dramatic increase in 1994, with three hundred
twenty-one content units seen in nearly all of the thematic classifications led by theme two, with one hundred twenty-two
references (38%). Themes two and five also had the highest increases in 1994, escalating forty-two percent and forty percent
from the year before. Themes four and eight each decreased.
The assertion that the poor live better (theme four) was an
unanticipated theme that contained forty-seven references
between 1992 and 1993. but dropped to three references in
1994.
There were a wide variety of claims about the inadequacy
of the welfare system in category one. For example, Michael
Tanner (1994) at CATO asserted the federal government had
“spent more than $3.5 trillion on social-welfare programs since
the Great Society of the 1960s. Yet the poverty rate today is
higher than when we began” (p. 12A). According to William
J. Bennett (1992), fellow at Hudson and Heritage, “Americans
have developed an unhealthy reliance on, and unrealistic expectations about, what the federal government will do for
them. We have to begin to alter people’s assumptions about
the federal government’s role” (p. A17). David Murray (1994)
at Heritage equated welfare participation with marriage,
stating, "In America, we are pursuing the dangerous course of
replacing families with the indifferent welfare state, now the
official pater of vast numbers of children. Welfare mothers are
marrying the state, as it were…" (p. 18).
Disputing official poverty statistics and assumptions
about the poor, Robert Rector at Heritage claimed, “For most
Americans, poverty means destitution, an inability to provide
a family with nutritious food, clothing and reasonable shelter.
Only a small number … fit that description” (Ross, 1993, p.
22). The net effect of misleading poverty figures by the Census
Bureau that inflate government spending, argued Rector, is
“millions of children who grow up without fathers, adults
who lack the work ethic and the dignity it provides, and entire
generations robbed of real dreams and hopes for the future”
(Rector, 1992, p. A10). Underscoring an assumption about the
pernicious effects of the welfare system, Walter Olson (1992)
of the Manhattan Institute claimed, “almost everyone who
gets a job in this country escapes poverty. Yet poor adults are

174

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

working much less than they used to, and most do not work
at all. The problem is absence from the labor force…” (p. A14).
In a review of a book by Myron Magnet of the Manhattan
Institute, the columnist George Will summarized the thesis of
the book in the following manner:
Since the 1960s such central institutions as the law,
universities, public schools, the welfare and mental
health systems have been permeated with [liberal]
1960s values. Often the changes have been driven
by a perverse premise—that the social order is an
infringement on freedom rather than freedom’s
foundation. (1993, p. C7)
The second thematic category shifts towards policy prescriptions. Welfare reform goals and objectives comprise the
primary thrust in this section. For example, Charles Murray
(1993), fellow at AEI in the 1990s, proposed ending all support
to single mothers stating, “The AFDC (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children) payment goes to zero. Single mothers
are not eligible for subsidized housing or for food stamps” (p.
A14) in an editorial that garnered the attention of Congress
and the White House. Rector (1994) argued in an op-ed that
the general goals of welfare reform should be the elimination
of “illegitimacy, divorce and non-work” (p. 7B).
Policy proposals included such recommendations as devolving the federal government’s role to the states, requiring
work and education for program participation, and displacing the state with the private sector. Charles Finn, Jr., of the
Hudson Institute, stated “nobody in Washington should tell
people at home what to do or how to do it,” (cited in Walters,
1994, p. 1) implying that states understood their population’s
needs better than an intrusive federal government. Arguing
about the primacy of the free market, Burton Yale Pines, Vice
President at Heritage, said “it is economic growth that makes
it possible for living standards to increase for nearly every
American. It is growth that defeats poverty. Reagan reminded
America that government cannot create economic growth and
that government generally is the enemy of economic growth”
(cited in Thomas, 1994, p. G-04). The NCPA suggested a transfer of the welfare system’s administration to the private sector
(Fund, 1994).
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Discussion
At the outset of this study I claimed that its purpose was
to re-explore the descriptive research approach taken in work
about think tanks in a systematic manner. Their structural role
is operationalized as brokerage with an analytical technique
instigated by a case study of conservative think tanks that participated in 1990s welfare reform. The technique was devised
from knowledge of these actors’ resource induced ties derived
from their media-related policy advocacy and relationship to
private financing. Thus two sets of questions were asked. The
first set dealt with each of the methodological components: the
relational and affiliational characteristics of the think tanks and
a semantic interpretation and frequency count of their policy
preferences in print media. Each of these paints a fractured
picture of their activities. The second set of questions concerns
the implications for integrating each method and is, in a sense,
the core of the study’s focus. The resource types—bookmarked
on the receiving and diffusion ends—that tied these brokers to
peripheral yet integral organizations motivated the third and
fourth research questions. It is the second set I discuss below.
Structural Equivalence and its Qualitative Cousin
The standard network analysis procedures of the technique illustrate the social context of think tank relations and
affiliation emanating from financial ties. Other network measures could be substituted to demonstrate the existence of a
network. However, the third research question suggests that
the affiliation and cluster measures derived from dependence on donor money may influence what policy issues
they consider and how they articulate prescriptions of them.
Preference for the dominance of the private sector over an intrusive welfare state and its policies, like general cash assistance (i.e., welfare), is evident in both the foundations’ mission
statements and think tanks’ media advocacy. The autonomous
implication of general operating grants, however, does not diminish the need to satisfy the intent of institutional donors.
The structural equivalence findings point to a competitive relationship (Knoke & Yang, 2008) between think tanks as a result
of their similar ties to foundations. As non-profits, they try to
garner as many financial donations as possible from these and
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other like-minded sources. We may speculate that the public
disclosure of grant recipients in either foundation reports or
their IRS 990-PF tax filings “encourages [think tanks] to model
their beliefs and behaviors after one another” (Knoke, 1990,
p. 11). Looking at Table 1 suggests all but CATO are aggressive in their fundraising strategies towards the set of foundations in the network. However, as media reports have pointed
out, CATO derives significant amounts of resources from one
of its founding and still active board members, the billionaire
Charles G. Koch, thus their relatively lower structural equivalence scores.
Turning to the media advocacy results, we find how the think
tanks collectively put their stamp on welfare reform. It would
be presumptuous to equate network results and frequency of
media appearances as compatible measures. Nevertheless, the
premise of this study’s brokerage analysis rests on the proposition that a key resource (i.e., policy analysis) that these organizations manifest is a consequence of its network representative
role. Combining any quantitative measure with a qualitative
one raises the question of compatibility. Let’s look at AEI by
way of example. It was the organization most connected to
foundations through grants in all three years (see Table 1), but
was referenced by print media the second most during the
three-year period. Does this mean it had the second most effect
among the sampled think tanks towards the development of
welfare reform? A closer inspection of its policy proposals suggests it may have been the most influential think tank with
welfare reform. AEI’s Charles Murray, a leading voice of conservative thought on welfare reform, was praised by President
Clinton for arguing that unwed births were a social problem
made worse by the welfare system (Bennett & Wehner, 1994).
Many scholars concluded that President Clinton assimilated
many of the assumptions put forth by conservative commentators on welfare reform, as evidenced by the provisions of the
bill he signed in 1996 (e.g., Goldberg & Collins, 2001).
In another example regarding to the third research question, CATO had the lowest affiliated score in the policy
network, but had the third highest occurrence of media citations for 1994. Perhaps CATO turned toward welfare reform
analysis with more resources after the Clinton administration’s
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national health care initiative, a policy this organization was
highly critical of, was perceived as declining in public support
(Rushefsky & Patel, 1997). Furthermore, when we compare
actors in the densest cluster, consisting of AEI, Manhattan, and
Hudson, we find only AEI with a significant amount of media
references. Yet, Manhattan and Hudson were early advocates
of devolving the federal government’s role onto the states, an
idea that was incorporated in the form of block grants found
in the final bill. This funding mechanism permitted each state
to dispense general assistance based on participation criteria
and time-limits that they determined. Perhaps the proposal
to devolve the state’s role was a foregone conclusion to the
outcome of welfare reform and more did not need to be articulated; this may have resulted in higher media frequency counts
for these proponents, had it been otherwise.
Herein lays the utility of the qualitative aspect of the technique that complicates how compatible it is with its network
cousin. It is through content analysis that the think tanks’ policy
preferences are identified. This does two things. First, it systematizes the think tanks’ collective leanings on a policy issue by
identifying, grouping, and calculating macro- and meso-level
themes. I arrived at two macro-level themes consisting of the
problematic features of existing welfare policy and reform prescriptions. The sub-categories in each articulate the collective
stamp these actors put on welfare reform. Second, this method
further identifies the thematic foci for each of these actors over
a three-year period as they articulated it. I was able to identify
who said what and compare them to claims-making in the narrative literature (e.g., Reese, 2005). The former is encapsulated
in Table 3 and the latter in the descriptive results shown above.
A surprising finding in the results yet not addressed in the
literature was the claim that the poor are materially privileged,
thus welfare programs are unnecessary (Table 3, Theme 4). It
was a compelling argument buttressed with data about material comfort (e.g., TV sets and microwaves owned per capita)
the poor enjoy today relative to the past. Though flawed in
their assumptions and analysis, this claim underscores the
long-standing myth that state relief indulges an indolent, materially privileged class that should be employed.
Most of the think tanks’ print media advocacy described
a pernicious welfare system. Criticism of welfare programs
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(Theme 1) coupled with assertions about the social damage it
inflicts (Theme 2) were the overall top claims. This is fitting
with a study by McCright and Dunlap (2000) that analyzed the
significance of conservative forces’ counter-claims to recast the
scientific consensus over global climate change. By not only
casting doubt but also redirecting the terms of policy debate
to include their policy views, these organizations were able to
insert themselves as legitimate alternative policy authorities,
despite being an insignificant minority within the scientific
community (McCright & Dunlap, 2010). In a similar fashion,
the results in Table 1 demonstrate the significance of persistent
claims-making about the deficits of the welfare system years
before welfare reform was enacted. Welfare reform had previously taken place in 1988, and it included provisions about
work participation, education, and greater local control with
which conservative policy analysts appeared content. Yet
welfare reform was resurrected in 1992, and conservative think
tanks took a vociferous stance about the welfare state’s destabilizing effect on individual liberty. Perhaps forging a consensus about this argument unlocked the box of provisions in the
1996 law advocated by conservative think tanks.
The newer prescriptions, minor by comparison, were no
less significant. Many of the provisions that conservative think
tanks advocated for (Table 3, Them 6)—devolution of program
administration to states; replacement of previous entitlement
features with a block grant program to states; lifetime participation limits; work requirements; family caps; and participation restrictions for immigrants—were codified in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, or welfare reform. Further investigation of similar data
from 1995 and 1996 is needed to determine how claims-making of welfare system deficits and prescriptions to remedy
them correspond with each other over time.
Brokerage Reconsidered
The fourth research question focused on the interplay of
mixed resources in brokerage. The illustration of the conservative think tanks’ structural location in Figure 1 identifies
the two distinct groupings of peripheral actors—foundations
and print media—that think tanks connect. But these ties are
not restricted to a single or communication-based tie, as the
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brokerage literature generally assumes. This study delves
deeper into the representational structure of conservative
think tank brokerage in pursuit of a public forum for the policy
preferences of its benefactors. In doing so, these representative actors bridge the structural hole Burt (2005) regards as
a basis of brokerage, taking advantage of media’s search for
policy expertise on complicated matters (Abelson, 1992; Katz,
2009). Thus, structural advantage is levied by think tanks in
the process of identifying and matching the interests of peripheral actors.
The study’s analytical technique recognizes the implicit
resource transformation of capital into information. The nominally unrestricted structure of general operating grants and the
funding patterns established by the foundations enables think
tanks to fashion their policy analysis within the ideological contours associated with their benefactors’ policy philosophies.
The resource conversion is suited for the financially dependent
think tanks. Their non-profit status limits their revenue generating activities. Smaller think tanks, like the NCPA, depend
on as much as fifty-two percent of their funding from foundations, while the more diversified organizations, like Heritage
and AEI, rely on twenty to twenty-two percent of their budgets
from this source. Thus, foundation grants are indispensable.
Therefore, the development and dissemination of think tank
policy analysis is contingent on these resources. Foundations
can monitor the amount and quality of press coverage their
grant recipients receive. All of the think tanks in the case study,
like many of their peers, tout their media appearances on their
websites. The analytical technique captures the relational and
resource bases of their brokerage.
The intellectual opinion role of academics, writers, policymakers, and other authorities in media is well established. The
marketing commitments of conservative think tanks merely
exploit this in a concerted manner. But two additional factors
require further examination. First, think tank policy analysts
are free from many, not all, of the institutional and resource
constraints imposed on many of these aforementioned opinion
leaders. This is critical to understanding the time, energy, and
creative inputs in the development and dissemination of policy
analysis when constraints are removed or minimized. While
Burt (2005) and others regard brokerage as circumstantial,
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there may be work-place or network characteristics that have
a higher propensity for brokerage development. Networks are
where action takes place. Identifying characteristics of these
environment producing networks may yield some answers as
to why brokerage occurs among some peers and not others
who participate in the same industry. We should not take it as
a given that brokerage just happens. Second, a neutral, nonpartisan façade may correspond with brokerage. For example,
the policy analyses of conservative think tanks in the case
study generally align with the Republican Party platform,
though their 501 © 3 status prevents them from lobbying and
other political activities that are not educational in nature.
Notwithstanding their legal status, think tanks or other policy
brokers may exploit niche contexts with media and the public
alike as neutral third-parties distant from partisan interests of
either major political party. Perhaps actors’ impartial status is
more likely to correspond with their intermediary location as
resource interlocutors, but further analysis is needed.

Conclusion
Scholars of elite think tanks have examined their involvement in the policy arena in various ways. The mission of think
tanks in general is to alter the policy landscape. Their relationships with legislators and governing bodies, the media, and
their funders work towards that end. The ways in which they
knead these relationships have important implications for how
policy preferences are disseminated to and received by scores
of constituents. For instance, the debate over climate change
and the validity of scientific claims regarding it are a function
of the input by conservative think tanks (McCright & Dunlap,
2003). A systematic understanding of these relationships is
necessary for these and other organizational actors as it relates
to their structural roles.
This paper introduced a novel analytical technique that
extends our understanding of brokerage. Question four suggests that brokerage is determined by resource types and the
context of their resource-based relationships. It is composed of
a dual formulation of methods at the relational and semantic
levels that examine the social structure of resource-based relationships. The context of these relationships is interpreted as a
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representative type of broker. The nature of the foundations’
funding commitment as an expression of trust, structurally
delegates think tanks to articulate a policy stance. The content
analysis results indicate two things: directly, the policy preferences of conservative think tanks as expressed in Table 3; indirectly, ties to media as result of media’s coverage with these
organization’s policy preferences.
The present study advances the theoretical and methodological approaches to brokerage by outlining its quantitative
and qualitative properties. What is the resource content of brokerage? While this article analyzes the mediating role of organizational actors in relation to disparate actors, its approach
can be replicated for persons in a restricted network when
both events and persons or organizations are represented. But
the study’s analytical technique is inhibited by constraints
that content analysis imposes. Mining the qualitative data is
time consuming. The larger the sample, the greater the room
for error. Nevertheless, researchers can continue investigating
brokerage dynamics that traverse networks to connect with
external environments. We need better mapping of brokers’
mediating role between distinct and seemingly unconnected
entities to understand, for instance, issues of power as it relates
to resource conversion, control, and diffusion.
A concomitant interest in social networks and globalization will certainly generate questions about the form and
content of roles that tie distant actors. Are their differences
between brokers in the for-profit and nonprofit private sector?
Are they more prevalent in the public sector? How does brokerage in marketing compare with brokerage of an espionage
nature? How do state actors function as brokers for the private
sector, as research seems to suggest they do for multinational
corporations? Are non-governmental organizations brokers
for justice? Research questions such as these necessitate a theoretical and methodological approach along the lines of this
paper’s technique to understand that the most visible actors
in any sector are not necessarily the most significant ones to
facilitating or constraining the flow of resources to dependent
actors.
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